Here is my page. It features my undergraduate thesis (on moral luck and blame), an article I had published in an undergraduate journal (on Kierkegaard and music), and more recent work related to the topics listed below.

Academic Philosophy

Prospective Reasoning for Dynamic Identities: Making Decisions That Make You Glad You Made Them

Presented at (includes scheduled):

  • Uehiro Graduate Conference, March 2022

  • Georgia Philosophical Society Spring Meeting, June 2022

When deciding whether or not to do something, we might try to imagine ourselves in the future, looking back on the choice we made with gladness or regret. If we'll be glad that we did it, it's a good sign that we should do it; if we'll regret that we did it, it's a good sign that we shouldn't. I focus on cases where the very decision to do something leads us to form attachments and commitments that make us especially likely to be glad that we did it. In the literature, this is generally seen as bad reasoning — we can't justify a decision by claiming that we will be glad we did it when making the decision turns us into someone who's glad we did it! I argue that it can in fact be very good reasoning, both because our identities are porous, dynamic things, and because it allows us to make decisions with an eye towards personal growth.

"You Have No One to Blame But Yourself": Gaslighting and the Line Between Intrapersonal and Interpersonal Deception

Presented at (includes scheduled):

  • University of Florida - Florida State University Graduate Philosophy Conference, March 2022

  • Great Lakes Philosophy Conference, April 2022

  • APA Eastern Division Meeting, January 2023

In normal deception, someone else leads me to have a false belief. Most accounts of self-deception try to specify what part of myself leads me to have a false belief. Is it a certain intention? Desire? Emotion? What all these accounts tend to ignore is that intentions, desires, and emotions are formed in a social context. In other words, just because my false belief arises from, for instance, a desire that warps my reasoning, that doesn't mean that, in another sense, it didn't also arise from someone else. As an example, I discuss "gaslighting," or the ongoing process of a perpetrator leading a victim to distrust her own ability to determine the truth. A victim of gaslighting will often form false beliefs in ways that fit the bill for accounts of self-deception, despite the fact that the process which, indirectly, led her to these beliefs was created and maintained by the perpetrator. In the end, the line between being deceived by myself and being deceived by someone else can be blurry, and attempts to clearly define the boundaries of self-deception tend to push a false dichotomy.